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Medieval violence has a bad reputation.  In the words of a student essayist, "Mideval [sic] 
people were violent.  Murder during this period was nothing.  Everybody killed 
someone".
1  Yet however much we might object to the sweeping generalization, the 
sentiment is not anachronistic.  Violence was condemned as harshly in the Middle Ages 
as it is today.  Consider the diatribe of the early eleventh-century bishop Burchard of 
Worms: 
Homicides take place almost daily among the family of St. Peter, as if they 
were wild beasts.  The members of the family rage against each other as if 
they were insane and kill each other for nothing...  In the course of one 
year thirty-five serfs of St. Peter belonging to the church of Worms have 
been murdered without provocation.
2 
This is violence without reason or justification, comprehensible only if viewed as 
insanity. 
Burchard's characterization of violence as a crime without reason was a little 
disingenuous, however.  Violence was often linked to vengeance in the Middle Ages, and 
vengeance was something that all could understand, even men of the church.  Whatever 
Abelard's sentiments about the loss of his testicles, he was surely not surprised when the 
kinfolk of the woman he had seduced and abducted came to the defence of her honour — 2 
and their own, for that matter.
3  The need for vengeance was as ancient as the lex talionis; 
in theology and Christology, the theme of God's vengeance had only recently given way, 
in the tenth and eleventh centuries, to that of his mercy and suffering.
4  Men of the church 
were perfectly aware of the social pressures that fostered vengeance in the secular world.  
The mendicant orders could not have emerged as Europe's foremost peacemakers without 
this understanding.
5 
This being so, we should understand the rhetoric for what it was and see 
vengeance as medieval observers would have seen it, as a practice worthy of 
condemnation that none the less had deep roots in society and served specific ends.  For 
vengeance does make sense: order arises from predictability of behaviour and vengeance 
carries an aura of inevitability.  This, at any rate, is what modern anthropologists have 
been arguing for some time.  As students of the stateless societies of north Africa and the 
circum-Mediterranean region began to observe in the 1940s and 1950s, the feud and its 
attendant institutions of peacemaking comprised a legal system that offered a basis for 
political order.
6  Medieval historians, of course, had long been interested in both feuding 
and peacemaking,
7 and the arguments of E. E. Evans-Pritchard and others concerning the 
feud were not slow to cross from anthropology to history.  A major conduit was an article 
published by Max Gluckman in Past and Present in 1955 called "The Peace in the Feud" 
which developed Evans-Pritchard's argument that the feud, as it expanded through the 
grades of kinship, inevitably compromised people with a foot in both camps; these were 
then activated to quell the discord.
8  J. M. Wallace-Hadrill cited Gluckman approvingly 
in his own work on the blood-feud in the Merovingian period.
9  The historical literature 
on this and related subjects has grown apace since the 1960s, offering a way to study 
order not from the top down, but from the bottom up.
10 
To describe vengeance and peacemaking as components of a logical and rational 
system, however, is to suggest that the practices can be isolated from other legal and 
judicial currents in medieval society.  This is a very dubious proposition.  In recent years, 3 
for example, legal anthropologists have argued that there was a good deal of cross-
fertilization between native or local legal systems and those imported by European 
colonists.
11  Much the same holds true for Europe, where centralized systems of law 
emerged at a more leisurely pace.  This being so, the most compelling history of 
vengeance and peacemaking lies not just in describing these practices as elements of an 
independent and rational system, but also in seeing how these practices, over the 
centuries, interacted with or were circumscribed by the developing legal systems of 
kingdoms and nation-states.
12 
The complex legal culture of the city of Marseille in the later Middle Ages offers 
profound insights into these processes of legal exchange and amalgamation.  Italianate in 
its commercial and legal culture, French in its family structures and destiny, 
Mediterranean in the breadth of its trade, the great Provençal port provides numerous 
grounds for comparisons.  Blessed with one of the earliest and richest runs of notarial 
documentation of any French locale, blessed equally with rich judicial archives, the city 
offers splendid resources to the historian.  Marseille's legal culture, moreover, is made all 
the more compelling by the city's unusual political circumstances.  A fiercely 
independent commune for much of the first half of the thirteenth century, the city had 
fallen in 1252 to Charles of Anjou, king and founder of the expansionist Angevin dynasty 
of Naples and count of Provence by virtue of a strategic marriage.
13  Yet in Charles' own 
lifetime, the Angevin dynasty — hobbled by the revolt of Sicily in 1282 and undermined 
by the general decay of Mediterranean trade that followed upon the heels of the Moslem 
reconquest of the Levant — was falling swiftly from the heights to which it had once 
aspired.  Preoccupied with its own intrigues, the crown had little energy to spare for the 
governing of Marseille.  By the fourteenth century the city had begun to drift out of the 
orbit of Naples, quietly seizing the independence it had tasted a century before and thus 
following a trajectory at odds with processes of centralization more common in the later 
Middle Ages.
14   4 
One result of this trend is that by the mid-fourteenth century, the city's courts, all 
of which were run by judges and functionaries nominated by the Angevin crown, lacked 
the power to back their authority.  Noble factions emerged, at least one of which was 
considered by an observer to be more powerful than the crown itself.
15  Given these 
circumstances, the Angevin-run court of inquisition, primarily responsible for criminal 
matters, was or became reluctant to prosecute murder and very serious acts of violence.  
Instead, judges built existing habits of settlement and peacemaking into their own legal 
edifice, allowing some measure of authority over homicides to devolve on to kinfolk and 
friends of the murderer and of the victim.  They did not invariably do so; evidence 
reveals that only those assailants embedded in powerful social networks or kin-groups 
could expect to benefit from the immunity from prosecution conferred by the threat of the 
feud or of factional retaliation.  The prosecution of violence short of murder reveals a 
noteworthy battle for rhetorical control that pitted defendants eager to display their social 
connections against judges interested in counting blows and not much else.  All these 
circumstances reveal the constant dialogue that existed between two seemingly distinct 
ways of handling violence, and suggest some of the complexities that underlay the legal 
transformations of late medieval Europe. 
II 
The court of inquisition was relatively new in mid-fourteenth-century Marseille.  In the 
early years of the commune, the judicial structure of the city had been rudimentary, and 
authority over affairs of violence, including feuding and peacemaking, lay with political 
leaders and peacemakers, not with courts.  Marseille's statute on homicide, for example, 
reveals that the authority to pursue and punish murderers was assigned to the rector and 
the councilmen of the commune.
16  This authority may have been a supervisory authority 
rather than a judicial one, the aim to produce a peace settlement rather than to punish.
17   5 
No court of inquisition, in fact, is mentioned in the constitution of 1252, called the 
Statutes of the Peace, which emerged as part of the peace-treaty between Charles of 
Anjou and the conquered city.
18  The document describes the operations of five civil 
courts, all of which were staffed by Angevin appointees whose terms in office lasted for 
no more than a year.  Two lesser courts handled civil pleas; the judges assigned to each, 
at least in the fourteenth century, were drawn from a pool of local jurists.  A third, called 
the palace court, was the major court of first instance, and behind it lay the courts of first 
and second appeals.  The latter three courts were staffed by jurists brought in from the 
outside.
19  By the mid-fourteenth century, in concert with transformations in Roman-
canon proceedings and the law of proof then sweeping over the Mediterranean region,
20 
Marseille had developed what the sources call a curia inquisitionis.  The court of 
inquisition was headed by the palace judge, who was assisted by an official known as the 
the vicar (vicarius), the chief Angevin representative in the city.  The vicar himself, or 
someone acting in his name, announced the sentences in public parlements, held five or 
six times a year in a square at the center of the city.  The inquisitorial mode allowed for a 
more active court, one more willing to view law-breaking as a crime against the state, 
than had hitherto been the case.
21  The essence of the inquisitorial method is that once a 
potential crime had come to its attention, the court was able, on its own authority, to 
initiate an accusation and assemble witnesses.  If the two witnesses necessary for a 
conviction in Roman-canon law were lacking, the court could use torture to extract a 
confession from the suspect.   
Most of the sentences passed down by the court of inquisition in Marseille were 
fines, even if we must acknowledge that other forms of punishment usually do not show 
up in records devoted almost exclusively to pecuniary concerns.  This much is indicated 
by a single register of fines paid by criminal defendants that has survived for the year 
1331, from December 1330 through November 1331.
22   Each of the entries in this 6 
register gives a brief description of five or ten lines of the main features of the sentence: 
below is a typical sentence, given here in full.   
On the same day: concerning Guilhem Alexi, condemned to pay a fine of 
20 shillings by the said lord vicar on the year and day above, since, with 
malice, and furious at heart, he threw Raymon de Tholosa to the ground on 
a public street.
23 
The register contains 492 entries; of these, 289 were for cases of violence or the 
threat of violence of one sort or another (including two rapes).  Most of the cases of 
violence involved relatively minor wounds or even nothing more than the drawing of a 
knife; the defendants were assessed fines averaging a little more than 30 shillings, 
equivalent to eight days of labour for an agricultural worker.  Many of the remaining 
fines were imposed for acts of a similarly confrontational nature such as bearing illegal 
arms (17) and making threats (15).  Fines for insults were especially numerous, totaling 
108.  In sum, confrontations of various descriptions account for 438 of the 492 entries.  
The remaining entries describe non-confrontational criminal acts; these include twenty-
two thefts and twenty fines for civil infractions such as selling flour illegally or going by 
night without a lantern.
24  Sexual delicts and blasphemy are utterly absent from the list. 
 
(insert Table 1 roughly here) 
 
This profile, thin in the secret crimes of the household and the sphere of morals, is 
at odds with the criminal profiles of other late medieval cities drawn from similar 
sources.  In nearby Avignon, as in Paris, courts assessed numerous fines for blasphemy, 
sexual delicts, and thefts.
25  The same holds true for Florence in the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries.
26  Marseille's inquisition, by comparison, was far more interested in 
prosecuting public confrontations. 7 
Logically, this kind of profile would emerge if the inquisition prosecuted only 
those cases in which malefactors had been captured in flagrante delicto.  To capture 
malefactors, the court of inquisition had developed a rudimentary police force led by the 
sub-vicar and sometimes by the vicar himself.
27  Transcripts of judicial inquisitions found 
in appeals court registers reveal that in cases involving violence, the sub-vicar and his 
familia often arrived while a fight was still underway, usually called to the scene by the 
neighbours.  As a result, the official of the court was able to seize the malefactors while 
the blood was still fresh on the knife or the insult still lingering in the ears of the 
witnesses.  The justice that resulted from this was summary: defendants in the cases I 
read were never allowed to present a defence.  The defence — this seems unique to 
Marseille — was reserved for the appeal.   
In no inquisition transcript from Marseille is there any indication that the court 
proceeded against criminal defendants merely on the basis of a report or a rumor, as 
courts of inquisition often did in other cities.  Several victims of theft, vandalism, and 
threatening language were forced to initiate their own accusations and assemble their own 
proofs.
28  This preference for cases where the malefactors were captured in flagrante 
reveals an inquisition unwilling to commit time and resources to the prosecution of crime, 
unwilling to pursue cases involving secretive behaviour or states of mind.  This was an 
inquisition, in other words, that dealt in open-and-shut cases, where the facts of the cases 
were obvious to all; appeals may have been limited in number precisely because the 
weight of condemning evidence was so great.  The hesitancy to tackle more difficult 
cases is one reflection of the court's lack of power. 
What was missing from the profile of fines assessed by Marseille's inquisition, 
therefore, is just as informative as what was present.  This is especially true when we 
consider another class of criminal behaviour that is conspicuous by its absence, namely 
serious woundings.  In the 289 acts involving violence or the threat of it, we find only 
seventeen where blood was shed.  There are no truly debilitating wounds such as 8 
amputations.  Most surprising, the list includes no fines paid for homicides.  In the entire 
register only one reference to a homicide can be found: during a street battle between 
Johanet Guis and Durant de Batuto, Durant was grievously wounded; he died a short 
while later.  A terse account of the incident was given to explain why a 6 pound fine had 
been assessed against eleven-year-old Guilhem Guis, the younger brother of the assailant.  
The lad had emerged from his father's house towards the end of the battle; knife drawn, 
he had chased the wounded man down the street.
29  His brother, the actual assailant, does 
not appear in the record. 
Whence this silence regarding homicide?  Jacques Chiffoleau, observing a similar 
phenomenon in papal Avignon in the fourteenth century, has argued that murderers were 
punished corporally: corporal punishments do not find their way into financial records.  
But Chiffoleau also observes that murderers usually fled the city before they could be 
captured;
30 moreover, the Avignon court did not always proceed against murderers and 
other violent offenders where proof of a settlement was offered.
31  Historians and 
anthropologists of law considering similar forms of judicial restraint see a simple reason: 
a judicial decision is an artificial ending that does not necessarily resolve the tensions in a 
dispute.
32  Murder is the offence most likely to generate bad blood between rival families 
or groups.  In the uncertain political climate of mid-fourteenth-century Marseille, the 
court of inquisition was more interested in establishing peace than in trying to stamp its 
tenuous authority on a potentially belligerent and independent-minded population. 
As it happens, it is not entirely correct to say that the court of inquisition did not 
prosecute homicides.  Records reveal that the court could pursue various lesser charges 
should it choose to move against murderers.  The possibilities included infractions like 
bearing illegal arms, congregating in large groups, and going about the city by night.  To 
take an example, fines of up to 100 shillings were assessed against several agricultural 
labourers and caulkers who had participated in a murder on 20 May 1342.
33  In addition, 
murderers who had fled the city could be accused of the crime and then, after failing to 9 
respond to a series of summons, be charged for contumacy.  In one particularly well-
documented case involving a member of the nobility, the squire Amiel Bonafos had 
participated in the murder of his bitter enemy, Peire de Jerusalem, in May of 1356.
34  
Following the murder, Amiel hid in the house of his infirm father; several nights later, he 
fled the city on horseback with a companion, seeking refuge in the countryside.
35  A trial 
was initiated by the dead man's uncle,
36 and since Amiel failed to answer the summons, 
he was assessed a staggering fine of 2,000 pounds simply for contumacy (...in duobus 
milibus librarum pro sola contumacia condempnavit...).
37  His allies, the Martin brothers, 
fared worse: each was assessed 4,000 pounds, and the prime instigator, Peire Martin, was 
assessed an additional 3,000 pounds.
38  To collect such fines, the court could and 
sometimes did seize the exiled man's property.
39  Technically speaking, the fine was 
collected for a violation of procedure (contumacy), not for murder. 
Peacebreaking was a third category under which violent offenders could be 
prosecuted.  It was clearly understood by all concerned that peacebreaking was a heinous 
crime — more serious, in fact, than the catalyzing offence.
40  From the transcripts of an 
inquisition into a small war between two elite factions that took place on or about 22 July 
1351, we learn that fines of up to 200 pounds were levied against the participants for 
breaking an existing peace.
41  As Thomas Kuehn has argued for acts of arbitration more 
generally, this strategy of prosecution worked because instruments of peace were civil 
contracts.  Peacebreaking could be prosecuted not as murder, but as breach of contract.
42 
III 
Yet these were indirect ways of prosecuting acts of grievous violence.  Instead of forceful 
resolution, we find a discretion consonant with the inquisition's hesitancy to prosecute 
criminals not arrested in flagrante.  It was a discretion that does not seem in keeping with 
its age, to judge by the violent retributions described in the statute books of some 
thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Italian and Provençal communes.  Men who murder 10 
shall be decapitated, declared a Veronese statute, and women cremated.
43  The Italian 
commune of Apricale, more imaginatively, buried its murderers alive.
44  "If he can be 
seized, he shall die", observe the statutes of Cuneo simply.
45 
Yet the violent language of these statutes obscures mitigating circumstances, here 
as elsewhere in Europe.
46  Several statutes list self-defence as a reasonable excuse, but 
the law could be mitigated in another way.  In the civic world of Mediterranean Europe, 
the authority of any given commune extended only so far, and the legal geography of the 
region consisted of an untidy patchwork of uncoordinated jurisdictions.  Each commune's 
jurisdiction was activated only when officers of the peace were able to seize hold of the 
murderer.  Beyond the borders of the commune lay the shadowy world of exile and 
banishment.
47  Whether the police force could seize offenders before they reached this 
world depended on its efficiency and, for that matter, on the eagerness of the commune to 
get involved.  We assume that communes were eager to exercise jurisdiction — the 
threats directed at murderers give every indication that murder was perceived as a crime 
against the whole commune, not just the family of the victim — but was this really the 
case?  In Marseille, as we shall see, it was not.  Murderers were frequently allowed to 
escape; even when they were caught, their subsequent incarceration, remarkably, was 
sometimes treated as if it were the equivalent of exile or sanctuary. 
To understand why, it is important to realize that exile and sanctuary, in Italy as in 
southern France, did not mean the end of some sort of legal jurisdiction over the case.  
Instead, jurisdiction over the absent malefactor was in theory transferred from the 
commune to the kin of the victim.
48  If a murderer could not be seized within the 
jurisdiction of Cuneo, for example, the sum of 100 pounds was to be extracted from his 
estate and he was to be outlawed — at least, until a peace was made with the kin of the 
victim.
49  The principle held for cases other than murder: 11 
It is declared that if anyone from Cuneo or its jurisdiction has sought exile 
or has been exiled for any crime, he will not be allowed to return nor 
should he do so — even if he has paid the fine for the offence — unless he 
first makes an agreement with his victim or his heirs.
50 
A similar passage is found in the statutes of Acqui,
51 and Apricale's state more tersely 
that the murderer will be perpetually exiled unless the heirs of the victim permit his 
return.
52  The statutes of both Verona and Nice indicate that exile was a common option 
and that a peace with the kin was a part of the ensuing judicial process.
53  With any luck, 
an exiled man could be back in town within a few years of a murder, restored in both 
reputation and wealth — and sometimes even more.  Five years after his involvement in 
the murder of Peire de Jerusalem, Amiel Bonafos had not only regained his city, he had 
also been appointed to one of the highest of council offices in Marseille, that of syndic.   
In a very curious way, the judicial competencies of court and kin in Italy and 
southern France hinged not on abstract legal principles but rather on the location of the 
murderer.  This was a product of a complex set of circumstances involving the nature of 
the police force, the quality of the murderer's networks of support outside the city, and 
the nature of the crime.  The harshness of statutory law, therefore, could be mitigated 
whenever the murderer escaped or was allowed to escape.  In such cases, the authority of 
the commune derogated in favour of kin.  Without clear evidence that executions were 
practised systematically in specific medieval communes, we cannot assume a priori that 
the law was always carried out with the promised harshness. 
Marseille's law concerning homicide and exile mirrors those of the Italian 
communes.  Redacted in the early thirteenth century, during the city's drive for communal 
independence, Marseille's book of statutes was based on a twelfth century model 
borrowed from Pisa.  The peace-treaty of 1252, in turn, absorbed the book of statutes 
virtually intact.  Because the council of Marseille had only limited legislative powers 
after 1252, and because the Angevins themselves were too preoccupied to attempt 
judicial reforms, the statutes underwent no changes in the century that followed; 12 
compared to the statutes of other fourteenth-century communes, which periodically 
underwent revisions and concordances, those of mid-fourteenth-century Marseille were 
manifestly out of date. 
The statute that governed homicides and other assaults resulting in death, entitled 
Qualiter Homicidia Puniri Debeant, or "How Homicides May Be Punished", ran as 
follows:  
  Since it is a matter of great importance to the republic that crimes 
go not unpunished, and especially homicides committed illicitly, by the 
authority of this statute we ordain ... that if anyone shall have assaulted or 
wounded or mortally injured anyone else in Marseille or its territory... 
[and] if perchance the man who did such things shall have fled from 
Marseille ... at no subsequent point in time may the criminal in any way be 
allowed or permitted to return to Marseille or its suburbs unless he shall 
have first made composition for the crime with four or five of the closest 
relatives of the murdered or dead man, and at the same time unless he, or 
another in his place, shall have first paid the fine assessed to him for the 
act or crime by the rector or councilmen or the Commune of Marseille (a 
rectore vel consulibus vel Communi Massilie)... 
  ...similarly, if the murderer shall be found or can be found 
anywhere within Marseille or its territory, then he shall be captured by the 
rector or by the councilmen of Marseille, or by others acting for them, by 
force if necessary, and then the rector and councilors shall do with him 
what they think ought to be done (que eis videbuntur facienda)...
54 
The text speaks of a public concern (Cum rei publice intersit plurimum...), but the early 
origins of the statute are revealed in the failure to define precisely what the commune 
could do to the person of the captured murderer.  The commune evidently was allowed to 
levy a fine, a right, to judge by the register of fines paid, that does not seem to have used 
often.  The text of the statute, however, is dominated not by this matter, but rather by how 
the rector and councilors should proceed once a murderer has exiled himself.  The statute, 
moreover, is careful to spell out the nature of composition and the grounds on which the 
exile will be allowed to return, officially transmitting a degree of power over the exile's 
fate to the four or five closest relatives mentioned in the statute. 13 
Once the murderer achieved exile, the system of peacemaking and arbitration 
came into play.  There is plenty of indirect evidence for this system in existing court 
cases from fourteenth-century Marseille.  In July 1339, for example, a dispute between 
two cutlers climaxed with some regrettable words regarding the paternity of the eventual 
plaintiff, Johan Suziol.  Johan's suit for defamation, asking for 100 pounds in damages, 
was then withdrawn when he subsequently submitted evidence to the effect that an 
agreement had been reached: to continue the suit would be to disrupt the fragile peace.
55  
Cases that ended in arbitration are common enough in the records: many or even most 
accuser-initiated trials ended shortly after the reading of the accusation, and only 18 per 
cent of 564 palace court trials over the period between 1337 and 1362 included the 
testimony of even one witness.
56 
As it happens, we have more authoritative evidence for peace settlements from 
the notarial archives of the period from 1337 to 1362: five notarized settlements for 
homicides and three further settlements for grievous wounds short of homicide.  These 
legal drafts,
57 variously entitled instrumentum pacis, compositio, concordia, and 
faciendum pacis, can be found in some of the seventy notarial casebooks
58 extant in 
Marseille from the middle quarter of the fourteenth century; they can be found alongside 
dotal acts, testaments, loans, apprenticeships, and dozens of other contracts offered by the 
Roman legal system of Mediterranean Europe.   All eight peace acts involve men and 
women of middling or low status: labourers, carpenters, butchers, bakers, furriers 
(notarial casebooks were probably considered too vulgar for the peace acts of the 
nobility).  As with all notarized acts, peace acts follow standard legal formulae that name 
the parties involved and define their subsequent legal responsibilities.
59  Since the extant 
notarial casebooks represent only a fifteenth of the original total, it is clear that such 
settlements were more common than these numbers suggest: had all notarial casebooks 
survived from the years 1337 to 1362 — there should have been around a thousand — 
they would probably have recorded as many as seventy-five settlements arising from a 14 
murder over a twenty-six year period.
60  The existence of these cases shows that peace 
settlements for some or most homicides and a for few grave injuries played a role of no 
small significance in the legal system of mid-fourteenth-century Marseille. 
The typical peace formula, significantly, included a clause declaring that all court 
actions on behalf of the victim would be dropped.  In one case, Isnart Bayle, the kinsman 
of a murder victim, made the following contract with the murderer, Guilhem Bascul. 
Isnart Bayle, in the names of those above and for himself and his heirs and 
successors and friends whoever they may be, through solemn intervening 
covenants, promised that he would not proceed further with the 
indictments made on these occasions by himself or by others.  Nor would 
he draw up others anew, nor consent that any be drawn up, nor even will 
any of those on his side make an effort that [a suit] be brought against 
Guilhem Bascul by any court, judge, or chief, by the inquisition or in any 
other way...
61 
The inclusion of this clause in the peace formula is probably the major reason why no 
remits for homicide appear in the register of receipts from the year 1331.
62   
The peace acts range in length from half a page to three or four pages.  The 
unabbreviated cases all begin with a preamble that speaks of the Christian desire for 
peace and of the agency of the Devil in spawning hatred.  In one of these acts, for 
example, we find that Adalacia Rogiera, the wife of the baker Jacme Rogier, was brought 
by the Devil's instigation to proffer many insults and contumacious words against Antoni 
Bort.  Antoni was so moved by wrath that he drew his sword and struck her on the head, 
killing her.
63  The effect of this argument was to treat her death as the result of Antoni's 
disabling and blinding rage — regrettable, but not homicidal.
64  Following a very brief 
statement of who had murdered or wounded whom, the formula pushes on to a 
description of the bad blood existing between the murderer (and sometimes his kinfolk) 
and the kin of the victim, the names of two to four of whom are enumerated.  When 
Guilhem Garrigas killed Uguo Clalpin, he and his uncle Andrieu made peace with Uguo's 15 
two cousins, Johan Bernis and Johan Bonaut, and with Peire, the son of Johan Bernis, and 
with two of the victim's maternal aunts (amicae), Huga Romea and Resens Berengiera.
65  
Similarly, the carpenter Guilhem Bascul, killer of Guilhem Turel, made peace with the 
butcher Isnart Baille, Laurens Gartin, and the rest of his victim's kin, relatives, and 
affines.
66  A peace is made and the kin of the victim are then sternly charged with the 
duty of keeping this peace; the force of these acts is generally directed against the 
victim's kin and not the murderer.  Arbiters, where named, were typically noblemen or 
other members of the patriciate.  For example, the two noblemen Montoliu de Montoliu 
and Aragon de Rabastenc, assisted by two men of common status, helped arrange a peace 
between the labourer Guilhem Johan and his kinsmen on the one hand, and the victim 
Peire Tallarone (whom Guilhem had wounded on the arm), and Peire's kinsmen on the 
other.
67  In some cases, mendicants, jurists, and other noblemen made their presence felt 
as witnesses to the peace.  The role of mendicant orders and other members of the regular 
clergy is particularly pronounced in the five peace acts arising from murders: all were 
redacted in the house of a religious order.  The three woundings, by contrast, were settled 
in the notary's house or in houses belonging to one of the parties involved. 
Rarely were the results of arbitration given in these acts, although we must 
assume that some form of arbitration had been undertaken prior to the making of any 
given act.  Sometimes an exchange of the kiss of peace was noted.  No money 
composition was ever expressly mentioned, although we can assume that a payment often 
took place.  The labourer Pons Gasin, killer of Alasacia Borgona, concluded a peace with 
her brother and two sons; in a separate act made on the same day, the murderer gave the 
daughter of his cousin in marriage to one of the victim's sons, adding a vineyard to the 
girl's dowry.  The dotal act expressly stated that the marriage was made to seal the peace 
and avoid future danger (pro pacem habenda et futurum periculum evitanda), and the 
vineyard was clearly part of the settlement.
68 16 
An exiled murderer, of course, could not be present when a settlement was being 
arranged — he only returned to approve the pact — and it was up to relatives and friends 
to arrange a peace.  Notarized peace settlements do not describe this process, and we 
must turn to court records to see how it worked.  Early in the year 1353, for example, 
Lois Orlet had sliced off the left hand of Johan Robert during a fight.
69  On 2 September 
1353, Johan brought Lois to court — not to accuse him of the amputation, but instead to 
complain about Lois's failure to fulfill certain conditions of the peace accord that had 
terminated the dispute: the peace had included a requirement that Lois pay for the 
medical care of his victim.
70  Testimony reveals that Lois had sought sanctuary in the 
monastery of St Victor immediately following the fight; the peace had been arranged by 
two city councilors, Guilhem Blanc and the nobleman Johan de Sant Jacme.  Lois's 
unnamed wife was also involved in making peace; testimony shows that she had offered 
the victim 100 pounds by way of settlement, and had sent medicaments to the wounded 
man.   
Two cases of capital importance show that even when the court seized hold of the 
murderer before he could seek sanctuary or make his escape from the city, it treated 
incarceration as exile.  One case from the year 1362 reveals that the butcher Anhellon 
Fabre, a man of some standing and good connections in the community, had been 
imprisoned immediately after he murdered his wife, Dulciana.
71  Those working on his 
behalf successfully made a peace with the agnates and cognates of his late wife, however, 
and Anhellon was released from prison.  In November, he had the audacity to come 
before the court to complain that his late wife's relatives were now harassing him, despite 
the peace.  In a similar case, from February of 1353, the cutler Nicolau Garnier was 
imprisoned for the murder of a goldsmith, Antoni Jardin.
72  His relatives made peace with 
the three known kinsmen of his victim, Guilhem Cauderie, Bernat Bonaut, and Jacme 
Bonaut, and had evidently gone to some lengths to search out these men.  None the less, 
the court refused to release him, as the murderer expected, because no peace had been 17 
made with the victim's widow, Johaneta — and it was Johaneta's resistance that was 
keeping the man in prison.
73   
In both these cases, the courts treated incarceration as exile or sanctuary.  The 
practice may have been more common than the number of cases suggests: we hear of 
these two only because difficulties arose during or after the process of arbitration.  The 
very existence of the practice, of the equivalency drawn between incarceration and exile, 
reveals the degree to which the court of inquisition was willing to forgo its jurisdiction 
over violent crime in favour of the catharsis of the peace settlement.  To judge by this 
practice, the ability of a murderer to escape the jurisdiction of the court, in Marseille or 
anywhere, should not be taken as evidence for the inadequacies of a medieval city's 
police force.  Instead, exile was part and parcel of an untidy but reasonably effective 
system for prosecuting and punishing homicide and other cases of violent crime, cobbled 
together from Roman-canon law and from local legal traditions and habits of 
peacemaking.   
This system, it seems, had been become so widely accepted in mid-fourteenth-
century Marseille that actual revenge killing, at least among people of common status, 
was relatively rare.  There are, at any event, no clear and unambiguous examples in the 
few surviving court records involving homicide between commoners, although several 
cases
74 hint at the possibility and the case of Julian Marquet, discussed below, involves 
an assault motivated by a desire for revenge.  The feuding nobility was another matter 
entirely; mid-fourteenth-century records reveal a series of revenge killings involving two 
noble factions that stretch back at least to 1309, and noble defendants, when prosecuted, 
used the logic of vengeance conspicuously in defending their actions.
75  Yet although 
common folk victimized by violence were more likely to pursue a peace settlement than 
were nobles, it was the threat of hatred and retaliation that gave the assailant an incentive 
to arbitrate.  The evident potency of this threat shows that the practice of revenge killing 
was not completely moribund among commoners. 18 
IV 
Delicate handling by the court may not have been everyone's prerogative.  And certainly 
genuine exile was not available to all.  It took resources to escape the city for the 
countryside: friends or kin in the city willing to undertake legal battles to preserve the 
abandoned estate and initiate a peace, friends or kin in the countryside willing to aid the 
miscreant.  Exile, therefore, was self-selected: only well-off criminals could actually hope 
to benefit from it.   
In considering what it should do with those left behind, the inquisition did not 
necessarily incarcerate murderers and wait for a peace settlement.  It moved more 
vigorously in those cases where assailants were kinless and friendless — that is to say, 
without power.  The evidence, almost by definition, is poor: it took resources to put up a 
fight that could be documented.  Yet hints found in the documents support the 
conclusion.  On 15 December 1357, Guilhem Robaut came before the judge of first 
appeals to retract a confession of homicide.
76  He declared that he had been coerced into 
confessing to the murder of a court crier, Guilhem Telhet, through fear of torture (metu 
tormentorum).  Begging a judicial delay so that he could organize his defence, the 
defendant explained that he had been unable to meet the original deadline "because of his 
poverty and his lack of kinfolk" (propter eique paupertatem et carenciam amicorum).  
One month later, on January 15, he was declared innocent of murder — a tribute to his 
legal acumen.   
In a second case, a wealthy cobbler and city councilor, Jacme Johan, had angrily 
denounced the city judges and the vicar for having hanged a certain man named Boryaca 
or Buryata, while at the same time allowing a notorious Catalan pirate, Peire Maura, to go 
free.  For the insult, Jacme had been fined 10 pounds, which he appealed in September of 
1357.
77  The charge against Boryaca was not given, but the name is not Marseillais in 
origin (hence the notary's difficulty in transcribing it), indicating that the man was a 19 
foreigner.  This is the only known hanging for the entire period from 1337 to 1362; the 
man's status as a foreigner almost certainly helped determine his fate. 
In a third, the inquisition apparently misjudged their man.
78  Late in the year 
1351, Uguo Jaume, originally from the fishing village of La Ciotat but now residing in 
the city of Marseille, was brought before the palace judge and charged with the murder of 
Martin Jordan, a citizen of Marseille.  The alleged murder took place in Calabria.  Uguo, 
who denied the accusation, was led to a room in the basement of the royal palace of 
Marseille and thence to an eculeum, the wooden horse used for torture; there, in the 
presence of three judges and a notary, his hands were bound behind his back and then 
raised until he hung above the ground.   But as he hung in this torturous way he called out 
to the notary, vive voce, saying, "I ask, I ask and require you, Uguo Berengier the notary, 
to make a public instrument for me!"
79  Immediately the judges ordered him brought 
down from the horse; an act was made; and the prisoner, presumably on the strength of 
the things said therein, was released.  As in the first case, powerlessness was 
compensated for by legal acumen.  Tellingly, we know of this case only because Uguo's 
wife, her husband lying crippled in bed, actually came into court to lodge a complaint 
against the judges.  Uguo was not wholly bereft of support. 
These are cases in which the inquisition made free use of execution and torture (or 
the threat thereof).  In others, we find that prisoners who did not dispute the charges laid 
against them were incarcerated and then released following a peace settlement.  The 
disjunction shows that the court of inquisition could adopt judicial postures that varied 
according to the status of the murderer; the kinless, the foreigner, the immigrant were 
treated with greater severity.  That assessment of status was negotiable, and both family 
and friends of defendants took pains to pack the court during trials to assist in the 
defence.  The press of bodies proved so burdensome that the council issued a 
proclamation in February of 1351 restricting those attending the defence of a case to 
lawyers and to the kinfolk of the defendant — fathers, brothers, uncles, nephews, and 20 
cousins.
80  But in the outdoor booths where the courts of medieval Marseille sat in 
justice, the ability of the council to keep friends and more distant kin at bay was surely 
limited.  An impressive show of solidarity could have had a considerable influence on the 
court. 
Such may have been some of the circumstances surrounding the peace of Guilhem 
Bascul, the carpenter, killer of Guilhem Turel.
81  There had been a melée, a rix.  Turel 
had been wounded and "wholly killed" (totaliter interfectus).  Bascul had then been 
arrested for the murder, subsequently banished, and condemned for contumacy (delatus 
tunc de dicto homicidio et propter eo banitus fuit et pro contumacia per curia Massilie 
condempnatus) — the procedure of banishing the murderer and then charging him with 
contumacy being a new twist on the court's custom of treating imprisonment as exile, yet 
another imaginative way to fine murderers for something other than murder.  Bascul 
made his act of contrition on Good Friday, in the Dominican's church, before a great 
congregation (coram omni populo ad divinia audienda congregato), under the watchful 
eye of the man who mediated the peace, brother Guilhem of Marseille, prior of the 
Dominican convent.  Bascul was on his knees.  Humbly and tearfully, he requested 
pardon.  He offered the kiss of peace and was embraced by his victim's kinsmen, the 
butcher Isnart Baille, Laurens Gartin, and unnamed others.  He seems to have been 
utterly alone and kinless.   
So why was he treated with a measure of respect by the court?  Why wasn't he 
imprisoned and tortured, like Guilhem Robaut or Uguo Jaume, or summarily executed, 
like Boryaca?  Like all notarial acts, this one terminated with a list of witnesses, seven in 
number.  Two were Dominicans.  The other five — Uguo Esteve, Jacme Gili, Antoni 
Bonfilh, Peire Bonfilh, and Bernat de Soluiers — were identified only by name.  Yet in 
searching through Marseille's archives I have found that all these men, like Bascul, were 
carpenters.  Moreoever, they all lived on the same street as Bascul, the Carpenters' Street.  
The kin group assembled on behalf of Turel was more than matched by Bascul's friends 21 
and neighbours, their willingness to throw their weight about possibly being what saved 
the man from inquisitorial excesses, allowing him to be banished and subsequently 
restored to his community.   
Having kith and kin was a sign of respectability, which in turn was rewarded by 
more lenient treatment, by the inquisition's derogation of authority to the victim's kin and 
to the peacemaking process.  The scarcity of trials for homicide makes it impossible to 
see the process at work in other cases.  Yet other trials involving less serious violence, 
such as the first of the two below, illustrate how defendants sought to impress the court 
by the depth of their social networks.  In such cases, the defence consisted as much in 
establishing one's reputation before the uninformed judge as in challenging the 
inquisition's sequence of events.   
V 
To judge by the surviving documents, exile was used exclusively by those guilty of 
murder or of very serious woundings.  The more trivial the wound, the more likely it was 
that the assailant would remain in town and risk arrest by the inquisition.  In a very 
curious and counterintuitive way, the judicial system of fourteenth-century Marseille was 
primarily responsible for acts of common and petty violence, leaving more serious cases 
to the system of arbitration and peacemaking.   
Yet what was common, and what was serious?  It was difficult for foreign judges 
to grasp the relations of enmity that sometimes lay behind acts of violence.  It was 
difficult to predict whether an assault might prickle the honour of the victim and give rise 
to a lasting hatred.  In practice, the court avoided the issue entirely.  To judge by the few 
inquisitions that have survived in the appellate court records, the court preferred to 
proceed with a mechanical kind of justice in cases of violence.  It counted the blows 
given but never inquired into motive and rarely bothered to establish the chronology of 
events leading up to the encounter.  This indifference to motive tended to trivialize 22 
violence; the trivialization of violence created grievances; and many defendants chose to 
pursue those grievances by means of an appeal.  In these appeals, we find defendants 
struggling to restore some dignity to their behaviour by establishing a chronology that 
helped explain their motives, sometimes using witnesses whose own probity enhanced 
the value of their testimony.  Two cases illustrate the process particularly well. 
The first is an appeal made by the master shoemaker Tomas Dorlos against a 10 
pound fine assessed for a severe beating he gave to a journeyman shoemaker, Jacme de la 
Barre, a native of France.
82  The fight between the two men took place in the late summer 
or early autumn of 1342 in a part of the city called the Agudaria, in the vicinity of a 
square alongside the port called the Scaria where many shoemakers formed a community.  
The inquisition took place immediately after the fight, and the appeal by Tomas was 
lodged a month or two later, on 29 October 1342.  In the transcript from the inquisition 
into the fight,
83 the witnesses all claimed to have seen Jacme, severely wounded, first 
defending himself against Tomas and then lying prostrate on the ground.  Peire de 
Moustiers, the first witness, reported that he heard the clamor (rumorem) from inside the 
house of the shoemaker Peire Chamonet.  Rushing out, he saw the victim bleeding in the 
street, the accused striking yet another blow with his sword.  Asked who else was present, 
the witness said many others whose names he did not know.
84  This ignorance of names 
suggests that the witness, Peire de Moustiers, was not a resident of the quarter; other 
documents show that he may have been a goldsmith or a labourer residing some distance 
away.  The next witness, the brassworker Johan Raynier, reported that he heard the 
clamor from his workshop on an adjoining street; coming to the scene, he saw the 
accused striking the victim several times with a sword.
85  This witness saw the fight in its 
earliest stage; he did not report that the victim had fallen to the ground, and explained 
that he had returned to his workshop almost immediately.  He, too, knew none of the 
names of the other bystanders.  Both of the next two witnesses, namely Salvaire Clemens, 
a resident of the quarter, and Bernat Spitalier, probably another brassworker, gave similar 23 
testimony: Salvaire seems to have arrived on the scene in time to see the initial stages, 
whereas Bernat reported the events after the victim fell to the ground.
86   
The testimony given by the witnesses for the inquisition was thin.  None of them 
appears to have been among those who raised the clamor.  All arrived too late to see the 
very early stages of the battle; all reported only a portion of the events, in a curiously 
disjointed fashion.  The sequence of events is confused: it is not entirely clear, for 
example, whether the wounds were inflicted before or after the victim fell.  With the 
possible exception of Salvaire Clemens, none of the inquisition witnesses was a 
shoemaker, and although this may have resulted from the unwillingness of the 
shoemakers to become involved in an intraprofessional dispute it is more likely that 
members of the profession were carefully pruned out by the inquisition.  When Tomas 
was given a chance to testify, all he was allowed to add was that Jacme had once worked 
in his workshop and had struck him first. 
This flattening of chronology and studied ignorance of the context of the dispute 
was typical of the inquisition style in other cases that came to be heard on appeal.  As a 
rule of thumb, the inquisition had no interest in probing into the sequence of events that 
had led up to the dispute.  Judges were not interested in finding out whether defendants 
were in any way justified in being angry; nor, as a rule, did they make any inquiry into 
the social context of the dispute or the reputations of the parties involved.  We cannot tell 
whether this inquisitorial habit was intentional or not — it may simply have been an 
incidental result of the custom of prosecuting those caught in flagrante.  Whatever the 
circumstances in this case, Tomas was offended, and in his appeal he tried to present the 
violence within the context of a larger dispute, including the social context.  He was not 
above name-calling: in the inquisition record, Jacme was called a shoemaker, whereas in 
the appellate hearing Tomas described his victim as a vagabond (homo vagabundus) and 
called him by the diminuitive form of his name, Jacomin.  But Tomas's primary concern 
was to show how his actions were justified by the real chronology of events, a 24 
chronology revealed by the list of titles or legal positions that he presented to the judge 
and aimed to prove through witnesses, as paraphrased below:  
1.  Jacme owed his ex-master some money.  One day Jacme, coming at 
Tomas (veniens versus predictum Thomassium), asked that he be 
paid his wages; Tomas responded "Pay me what you owe me", 
whereupon Jacme suddenly raised his hand and gave Tomas a great 
slap (magnam alapam) on the face. 
2.  Jacme then took his cane and further wounded Tomas. 
3.  Jacme, assaulting Tomas with one hand, seized him by the hair with 
the other and pulled him about.  Seeing that he could not evade the 
blows, Tomas drew his sword in self-defence (ad suum defensionem 
evaginavit gladium suum) and wounded Jacme; Jacme then let go. 
4.  Jacme was strong and robust, possessing bodily limbs of great size 
(habens extremitates corporeas magnas), and was more capable of 
hurting Tomas with a small knife than Tomas could hurt him with a 
great one. 
5.  Tomas was a peaceful man.
87 
 
The story seems realistic enough and includes several points, such as the debt and 
the original aggression by Jacme, that were not mentioned by the witnesses recruited by 
the inquisition.  To confirm this story, moreover, Tomas was able to recruit two 
shoemakers, a currier, a next-door neighbour, and a close friend, the squire Tomas de 
Portu.  These men constituted the respectable social network in which Tomas was 
embedded.  At least three of these witnesses had known the defendant Tomas for some 25 
time and hence were in a position to report favourably on the fifth point, namely that 
Tomas was a peaceful man.
88  All claimed to have witnessed the fight from beginning to 
end, and for the most part the testimony they offered corroborated Tomas's story well.   
The transcript ends with the declaration, "The case was dropped by a higher 
authority".
89  Yet it is doubtful that this outcome was in any way guaranteed.  Moreover, 
Tomas may well have spent more than 10 pounds on his appeal, and there is nothing to 
suggest that the crown was asked to pay these costs.  Obviously, Tomas was motivated 
by the sense of a miscarriage of justice as much as anything.  Moreover, since appellate 
cases were heard in booths in the city's central square, it is distinctly possible that the 
highly public nature of the appeal, with its presentation of Tomas as a reasonable man, 
would have served the useful end of restoring Tomas's reputation regardless of the 
eventual verdict.  The public nature of justice in Marseille, which may have helped the 
inquisition to trivialize violence and to shame defendants, was also a tool available to 
wealthy defendants to restore damaged reputations. 
A second case is that of Julian Marquet and Jacme Guilhem.
90  On a cloudy day in 
January of 1342, Julian, a fishmonger from Catalonia, and Jacme, a fisherman, had a 
running fight along the quay of the port, which led to blows being exchanged and blood 
spilt.  Witnesses testified that Julian had been walking along the quay away from the 
church of St Jean when he was accosted by Jacme, who (according to one witness) said to 
him "Aras es loc!" (leave this place!).  Knives were drawn; Julian turned and fled back up 
the street and into the tavern of Nicola Bonifilia.  Both men were yelling "Ar es ora! ar es 
ora!" and Nicola screamed "Sancta Maria acorres!" (Please help, St Mary!)  As the 
neighbours gathered, they saw Julian give Jacme a blow to the right arm, which was 
returned threefold by Jacme, who struck Julian twice on the head and once on the right 
hand.  One or two neighbours intervened at this point, placing a wooden bar between the 
fighting men.  Several witnesses for Julian claimed that as Jacme reemerged from the 
tavern, his brother, Peire Guilhem, challenged him in some way, saying, "Torna lo ferir 26 
car tu non las ben ferit" (roughly, "Go back and strike him again because you didn't get 
the job done"). 
Medical evidence given at the original inquisition suggested that both men were 
wounded to more or less the same degree; both were up and about a day or so after the 
fight.  Yet although Julian received three blows and managed to deal only one, and had 
not precipitated the fight, he was none the less fined 20 pounds by the inquisition, 
whereas Jacme got away with 15 pounds.   
In the inquisition record, a copy of which was bound into the appellate register, 
the court had made absolutely no effort to put the fight in any kind of context.  
Temporally the inquisition was limited to the time it took Julian to walk from the 
compound to the place where Jacme was waiting and the few minutes of the fight itself.  
Witness testimony was fragmented.  No inquiry was made into the kinfolk of the 
defendants, especially into the suggestion that Jacme's brother Peire was involved in the 
fight.  No inquiry was made into whether Jacme had planned the encounter.  No inquiry 
was made into whether Julian, as a fishmonger and tax collector on fish sales, was 
involved in any professional dispute with the fisherman Jacme.  Some of these points, it 
is true, emerged when the two men themselves were allowed to testify at the end of the 
original inquiry, but no effort was made to pursue these points through the testimony of 
corroborating witnesses.  In short, the court was focused intently on a short slice of time 
and a very limited set of motives.  A very limited set of motives indeed, for the court 
explained Julian's act of violence only by saying that Julian was "moved by the agency of 
the Devil" to strike Jacme the blow from which much blood flowed.
91  Julian was given 
the larger fine, according to this depiction of events, most probably because he was the 
first to draw blood, thus escalating the conflict from one involving insults to one 
involving weapons and bloodshed.   
As in Tomas's case, Julian's appeal consisted in part in establishing a chronology 
that highlighted his opponent's role in starting the fight and cast his own behaviour as 27 
self-defence.  But the logic of his argument was informed in part by the logic of 
vengeance.  He sought to prove that he lived in the Fishmonger's Quarter, several blocks 
away from the scene of the fight, and was not originally from Marseille but from 
Catalonia.  His enemy, by contrast, was from Marseille and made his hearth in front of 
the church of St Jean, as did relatives of Jacme, namely his brother and "many other 
agnates and cognates, affines and neighbours, and friends".
92  Last, he was alone on the 
day of the battle.  In this story, Julian was deep in enemy territory, stripped of the 
protective shield of kin.  As it turned out, the hostile assortment of agnates, cognates, and 
affines arrayed against him dissolves, upon inspection, into the sole figure of his enemy's 
brother, Peire Guilhem.   Furthermore, we find that his enemy Jacme did not live 
anywhere near where the violence took place; all witnesses agreed that he lived instead in 
the Praepositura, a section of the city many blocks to the north.  None the less, by 
heightening the sense of danger it made a good story and served to confirm the 
reasonableness of Julian's act of self-defence.   
Pointedly absent from his story was the rationale for the fisherman Jacme's 
aggressive behaviour.  In a remarkable revelation in the original dossier, however, Jacme 
himself explained to the judge of the inquisition that he had been wounded by an 
unnamed brother-in-law of Julian's some time during the previous year.  The implication 
is clear: his was a legitimate act of vengeance against the kinsman of an earlier aggressor.  
No effort was made during the original inquisition to inquire into this history, however, 
and Julian did not mention it on appeal.  Julian's silence regarding the vendetta is 
significant, for it shows that ordinary folk, unlike Marseille's nobility, were reluctant to 
tell the inquisition to stay out of their feuds, although this did not prevent Jacme from so 
doing.  One did better to employ a language of self-defence, delicately tinged with the 
odour of bad blood, and leave the thinking to the judge. 
Tomas de Portu in the first case and the two antagonists in the second were faced 
with very different situations.  Tomas could not offer an argument based on hatred or the 28 
prospect of vengeance because his victim was friendless.  He was forced to play the card 
of good reputation and self-defence — strategies that were common enough in other 
criminal and civil court cases.  In the second case, by contrast, Julian evoked the threat 
posed by his antagonists's kin; Jacme, in turn, offered an argument of justifiable 
vengeance.  Arguments based on the existence of mutual hatreds were common in cases 
involving violence between nobles; if less common in cases involving commoners, they 
can be found in this appeal and in several other cases.  Hatred was felt to be a prerogative 
of the powerful, of those with kin, friends, and allies.  Court rhetoric, intentionally or not, 
removed acts of violence from the context of anger or hatred and in so doing tended to 
make common violence common, explainable as the product of insanity or diabolical 
influence rather than rational thought processes.  By evoking hatred in their appeals, 
criminal defendants were able to make their petty acts of violence seem more heroic. 
As with exile, the appellate process favoured those with resources.  The lowest 
cost found in these records was 6 pounds, already more expensive than all but a few of 
the fines assessed, and the highest cost for an appeal was 42 florins, the price of a modest 
house or a decent-sized vineyard, well beyond the reach of all but the wealthiest 
citiziens.
93  As a result, appeals were not common.  Over the years between 1337 and 
1362, twenty-one registers of Marseille's court of first appeals have survived, containing 
only thirty cases involving violent confrontations.  The negotiable qualities of the system 
clearly favoured those with money.  Others had to suffer in silence.  If legitimate violence 
and the pursuit of vengeance came to be restricted to members of the European elite, this 
was not necessarily because common folk were not honourable.  Over time, they may just 
have lost the chance to tell us so. 
VI 
To judge by the example of Marseille, justice did not emerge in medieval Europe fully 
formed, like Botticelli's Venus on the waves of a turbulent past.  Nor was peace 29 
something that figures of authority imposed on a lawless and violent population, although 
the legacy of Hobbes encourages us to interpret the Christian discourse of peace in this 
way.  Habits of peacemaking were ingrained in medieval society, along with those habits 
of vengeance that gave the spur to peacemaking.  Some law courts recognized the utility 
of peace.  Peace is fulfilling.  It satisfies.  And in certain circumstances, the royal court of 
Angevin Marseille was willing to allow the peace process to have its way, deferring its 
own authority over homicide and other crimes of violence to ensure that the peace 
process would not be derailed by a hasty judgment.  Both the power vacuum and the 
continuing reality of group vengeance encouraged this caution.   
But a peace was effective only where assailant and victim alike were embedded in 
matrices of kin and friends, where both parties involved possessed a certain social 
standing.  This was a matter for negotiation, not an object of common knowledge, 
especially to judges who were foreign to the city, to its families, to its neighbourhoods 
and its problems.  So we see justice practised in a discretionary, delicate way.  We see 
people anxious to discover groups of kin and friends, groups that would legitimate their 
claims for preferential treatment.  We find numerous men, like Guilhem Bascul and 
Tomas de Portu, embedding themselves in networks of friends when kin were in short 
supply.  We see subtle rhetorical battles taking place in court, as inquisition and 
defendant alike sought to define the context in which acts of violence took place.  In 
these practices for handling violence, there was room for negotiation and flexibility, 
judicial abuse and popular resistance.  It was a system without clear rules.  It was a 
system that the judges and the judged made up as they went along.  This was not a legal 
system that knew where it was going, that developed according to an internal logic 
regardless of the ends that it served, of the people who used it.  It was a hybridizing 
system, one in which the act of vengeance would eventually merge into the art of 
litigation, leaving a taste of revenge in the writs and pleas that supplanted the swords and 
knives of an earlier era.
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  Table 1: Profile of criminal prosecutions in Marseille, 1331-1332 
 
type of incident  number  per cent 
violence or threats with weapons  289  58.7% 
insults  108  22.0% 
verbal threats and other confrontations  24  4.9% 
theft  22  4.5% 
civil infractions  20  4.1% 
bearing illegal arms  17  3.5% 
unidentifiable  12  2.4% 
total  492  100.1% 
     





*I owe thanks to many friends and colleagues for reading and discussing drafts of 
this paper, including Thomas A. Green, Raymond Grew, Sarah Harrison, Diane Owen 
Hughes, Ellen Poteet, Kathleen M. M. Smail, Raymond Van Dam and six anonymous 
readers. 
1Anders Henriksson, "A History of the Past: 'Life Reeked with Joy'", Wilson 
Quart. vii (1983), p. 168.  This is a collection of quotes from student essays put together 
by a professor of history. 
2Quoted in Oliver J. Thatcher and Edgar Holmes McNeal, A Source Book for 
Mediaeval History (New York, 1905), p. 559; original source, Monumenta Germaniae 
Historica, Leges IV, vol. 1 (Hanover, 1893), p. 643.  The passage goes on to declare the 
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